With less than a month until 'Star Wars and Philosophy' hits bookstores, I figured it'd be good to post one more essay to keep the discussion going.
Enjoy!
“IF DROIDS COULD THINK …”: DROIDS AS SLAVES AND PERSONS
Robert Arp
Years ago, I watched Star Wars: A New Hope with a blind person named Mary. She asked if I could describe to her what was going on throughout the movie. After the 20th Century Fox fanfare ended and the wonderful John Williams soundtrack began, I read the opening paragraphs to her. What happened after the next few scenes was fascinating. She listened to C-3PO’s opening dialogue where he says somewhat frantically, “Did you hear that? They shut down the main reactor. We’ll be destroyed for sure! This is madness! We’re doomed …” However, before I could describe the scene to her, Mary asked me, “What does that man look like?” I told her it was not a man, but a droid – a gold-plated robot who looks like a man. She paused a moment and continued, “Oh … It sounded just like a man.” Being naturally inquisitive, I asked Mary what made her think that C-3PO was a man. Her response was that C-3PO used language, and had expressed the emotions of fear and concern.
My exchange with Mary was fascinating for two reasons. First, if I were blind, and a robot approached me on the street and started talking to me the way C-3PO does – with all of his over-dramatizing of events, expressions of reluctance, and name-calling – most likely I would think a human being was talking to me.
Second, my exchange with Mary made me re-think Threepio’s role as a protocol droid built to serve other human beings in a slavish capacity. If C-3PO looks and acts like a person – if he uses language, has certain advanced cognitive skills, is aware of his surroundings, and can feel emotions and express concerns – then what really separates him from actually being a person, other than his silicon and metallic innards and appearance? Furthermore, if he could qualify as a person, then shouldn’t such a robot be granted the same kinds of rights and privileges as any other human being who qualifies as a person? If droids meet the conditions for personhood, I question whether they should be granted at least limited rights and privileges, including the ability to choose to work in the Star Wars galaxy, as opposed to being slavishly “made to suffer, it’s our lot in life” (to use Threepio’s words) at the hands of biological persons.
“He’s Quite Clever, You Know … For a Human Being”
The first thing we need to do is get at the fundamental nature or essence of what it means to be a person. So, what is the definition of a person? A person is a being who has the capacity for (1) reason or rationality; (2) mental states like beliefs, intentions, desires, and emotions; (3) language; (4) entering into social relationships with other persons; and (5) being considered a responsible moral agent.
Before asking whether droids meet these criteria – and if so, which droids – we should consider the matter of whether a body is absolutely necessary in order to be considered a person. Among the criteria for personhood just given, there is no mention of a physical body. Important implications can be drawn from this omission. First, what it means to be a person is not tied directly to having an intact bodily existence. Take someone like the famous physicist Stephen Hawking. Here is a man whose body is ravaged by disease, is confined to a wheelchair, and needs machines in order to communicate. Yet, we would still consider him a person because, despite his bodily limitations, he fulfills criteria (1)-(5). He does this because his brain is still functioning properly and his cognitive capacities remain intact. He reasons, feels, communicates (albeit, with the help of machines), and has been able to form strong social bonds in the scientific community, as well as in his personal life. So, on the face of it, it appears that cognitive capacities are what to look for when trying to discern whether a being qualifies as a person, and the brain, or something that functions like the brain, is the seat of this cognitive capacity.
If bodily existence is downplayed and cognitive capacities are what really count when defining a person, then droids like C-3PO and R2-D2 could be considered as persons, provided their cognitive capacities are the same as other persons. We naturally think that persons will be biological entities with brains who breathe air, metabolize carbohydrates, and take in water for nourishment. Right now, however, it’s possible to simulate various biological parts of bodies artificially; there are artificial hearts, artificial kidneys, and even artificial eyes. Suppose that a scientist develops an artificial occipital lobe (the back part of the brain) out of silicon and metal, and implants it into the brain of an adult female human being. The artificial lobe performs the same functions that a natural occipital lobe performs: it processes visual information from the environment. So, with her artificial lobe she can do the same thing that she could do with her natural lobe – she can see the world around her. Say that the scientist develops artificial silicon and metallic parts of the brain responsible for memory, and implants these into our subject’s brain. She now can store and recall memories with the artificial parts of the brain in the same way she could with her natural parts. Now, say the scientist develops an artificial silicon and metal brain in its entirety, and implants it into our subject. With this artificial brain, she can do all of the same things she did before her transplant; she lives, loves, lies, and meets all of the criteria for personhood. Would she actually be a person, however, given that her brain is robotic? Say the scientist can simulate all parts of her body with silicon and metal, and thus replaces her biological body with a robotic body. She now is fully a robotic being with all of the same hopes, fears, responsibilities, loyalties, and so on, as any other human being. Would she (or should we say it?) actually be a person?
It seems possible to simulate the mental capacities necessary for personhood through physical things other than the brain. Why would one need to have a brain in order to think, believe, feel, experience, and the like, if such cognitive capacities can be simulated by other means? Think of an android like Data in Star Trek: The Next Generation, or the replicants in the movie Blade Runner, or the synthetics like Bishop (as Bishop says they prefer to be called) in the Alien movies. These are examples of beings that act like persons, yet the internal workings of their “brains” consist of a series of silicon and metallic connections, or other artificial systems, that are very different from the gray matter of the brain. So it seems that a functioning brain, or something that functions like a brain, with all of the cognitive capacities associated with such functioning, is the most important thing to consider when determining whether something qualifies as a person.
“If Droids Could Think, There’d Be None of Us Here, Would There?”
Now we can address the question as to whether droids qualify as persons. The first qualification has to do with the capacity for reason or rationality. In one sense, reasoning is the same thing as intelligence, and involves a variety of capacities, including (a) calculating, (b) making associations between present stimuli and stored memories, (c) problem solving, and (d) drawing new conclusions or inferences from old information. Do droids qualify as rational or intelligent in these senses?
Droids obviously make calculations. In The Empire Strikes Back, C-3PO lets Han Solo know that the odds of successfully navigating an asteroid field are approximately 3,720 to 1. Also, in The Phantom Menace Droidekas judge distances while rolling up to, and firing their lasers at, Qui-Gon and Obi-Wan aboard the Trade Federation ship. Droids also have memory storage capabilities, and can recall memories based upon present stimuli. When Jabba’s droid manager, EV-9D9, notes that R2-D2 will make a fine addition to Jabba’s sail barge crew, he can do so only because he has a memory of the barge, the crew, the work detail, as well as a capacity to associate Artoo’s actions with the barge, crew, and work detail. C-3PO knows “six million forms of communication,” has been on many adventures with Artoo, and is able to recount his past experiences to Luke – he even recounts the story of the previous Star Wars films to the Ewoks in Return of the Jedi. Furthermore, droids can solve problems. In Return of the Jedi, Artoo takes the initiative to open the door to the command center on Endor while he, Leia, and Han are under attack by stormtroopers. Artoo performs similar mechanical problem-solving when he gets the Millennium Falcon’s hyperdrive to work in The Empire Strikes Back and the Naboo Royal Starship’s shields up to escape the Trade Federation blockade in The Phantom Menace.
Finally, droids seem to be able to reason by deductively drawing conclusions and making inferences. Think of the holographic chess game played between Artoo and Chewbacca on board the Millennium Falcon in A New Hope, and Han’s comment that “a droid don’t pull people’s arms out of their sockets when they lose. Wookies are known to do that.” C-3PO comes to the conclusion that Artoo should choose “a new strategy. Let the Wookie win.” This conclusion is arrived at by a process of reasoning that goes something like this:
1) Premise 1: If Artoo wins, my arms will be pulled out of their sockets.
2) Premise 2: I don’t want my arms pulled out of their sockets.
3) Conclusion: Thus, Artoo should let the Wookie win.
Artoo also displays some clever deductive reasoning in his first conversation with Luke. He deceives Luke into removing his restraining bolt by falsely claiming that its removal will enable the image of Princess Leia to return, knowing how much Luke would want to see the entire message. The little manipulator appears to have reasoned his actions through quite well.
“I Am Fluent in Over Six Million Forms of Communication”
Just because something can reason does not mean that it is a person. A computer can be trained to reason in the same way that C-3PO does with Chewbacca, or Artoo does with Luke – making step-by-step calculations – yet, we would not consider a computer a person because of this capacity alone. Persons have the capacity for mental states and language. Mental states are a part of a human being’s psychological life and include such things as holding a belief, having a desire, feeling a pain, or experiencing some event.
Probably the best way to understand what a mental state consists of is to close your eyes and think about experiences where you felt some pain, jumped for joy, or regretted a decision you made. First, think about the pain you experienced. Maybe it had to do with touching something that was very hot. Recall how that pain was all-consuming for its duration, how it lingered in your body, and how you thought, “Ow! That HURT!” (and maybe expressed some other choice intergalactic expletives). That was your pain, and no one else’s; only you could know what that pain was like. Only Han knows what his pain is like when the hydrospanners fall on his head in The Empire Strikes Back. All we can know is that he experienced pain based on his vocal expression: “Ow! … Chewie!”
Now, recall a time when you felt joy and elation over some accomplishment of your own or of someone else’s, like winning an award, or your favorite team scoring the winning goal in the last seconds of the game. Recall the experience: how you smiled, relished the moment, and wished that every moment could be like this one. Only Luke and Han know the joy of receiving a medal for heroism from the beautiful Princess Leia at the end of A New Hope – poor Chewie doesn’t get to have that experience himself.
Finally, think of a decision you made that you have come to regret. You believe now that you could have made a different, better decision back then. And now, having thought about it, it may cause you pain. Surely many such regrets passed through the dying Anakin Skywalker’s mind after his redemption at the end of Return of the Jedi.
These three experiences seem to get at the idea of a mental state because they entail beliefs, emotions, desires, and intentions. It would seem that only members of the human race experience such mental states. We don’t have any evidence of other animals realizing that their pain is their pain, relishing moments, thinking back to past events with regret, or looking forward to future events with joy and anticipation.
The capacity for language is another qualification for being considered a person. Language is a tricky thing to understand, and many people think that each kind of animal has its own language, including bees, ants, apes, dolphins, and even Tauntauns (just to name a few). We must distinguish, though, between communicating some information and speaking a language. Whereas communicating some information does not require having mental states, speaking a language does entail mental states. When speaking a language, it seems that more than mere information is communicated; beliefs, desires, intentions, hopes, dreams, fears, and the like are relayed from one person to another. Many beings can communicate information by relaying some useful data back and forth to one another. All animals do this to some extent. A bee is not speaking to another bee when doing his little bee dance in order to communicate information about where pollen is located outside of the hive. I know this is going to sound controversial, but even apes who have been taught sign-language are not speaking (using a language) to their trainers; they merely are associating stimuli with stored memories. As far as we know, no bees or apes have experiences of joy, hope, or anticipation to communicate.
Do droids have capacities for mental states and language? There are plenty of examples of droids apparently engaged in behaviors expressive of mental states and language. One glaring example is the torturing of a droid at Jabba the Hutt’s palace in Return of the Jedi. When the droid’s “feet” are burned, the little guy appears to know what is going on, anticipates the pain he’s going to experience, and screams in pain and terror when the hot iron is lowered. (Interestingly enough, one also gets the sense that the droid administering the torture is enjoying what he’s doing.)
C-3PO expresses emotions himself on numerous occasions. Before getting into an escape pod with Artoo he claims, “I’m going to regret this.” On Tatooine he despairs, “How did we get into this mess … We seem to be made to suffer, it’s our lot in life.” After reuniting with Artoo in the Jawa sandcrawler, Threepio exclaims, “R2-D2! It IS you! It IS you!” When Luke comes back to discover Artoo has gone off to look for Obi-Wan Kenobi, he finds Threepio hiding (expressive of shame) and begging not to be deactivated (expressive of fear). When Luke returns to Yavin Four after destroying the Death Star, and Threepio realizes that Artoo has been damaged, he offers his own body parts in order to save his little friend. In The Empire Strikes Back, C-3PO expresses sorrow and reverence when Luke cannot be located before the main doors of the Hoth outpost are shut for the night (because Luke likely will freeze to death), frustration at having Han’s hand placed over his mouth in order to shut him up, as well as fear before being shot by stormtroopers on Cloud City.
C-3PO exhibits many more examples of anticipation, fear, anger, joy, as well as put-downs (“you near-sighted scrap-pile” and “overweight blob of grease,” directed toward Artoo) and passive aggression (“fine, go that way, you’ll be malfunctioning in a day,” again directed toward Artoo). Threepio and Artoo share a very human-like, personable relationship wrought with the same kinds of normal, as well as abnormal, communication that any person may have in relationships. This is probably why we find them so appealing as characters – sometimes more so than the actual human characters in the films. Think of the brief exchange between Threepio and Artoo in A New Hope after Luke leaves for dinner with his aunt and uncle, Artoo asks C-3PO if Luke “likes him” and C-3PO responds, “No, I don’t think he likes you at all. (Plaintive whistle from Artoo). No! I don’t like you either.” It’s an adorable scene to the viewer precisely because the communication is tongue-in-cheek and somewhat dysfunctional. It would seem that this kind of communication takes place only between beings having true mental states.
Besides having and expressing emotions, droids also seem to have beliefs about themselves, others, and the world around them. And they act on those beliefs whether it is to save themselves, aid others, or engage in other kinds of actions. Put another way, they appear to be free in their actions precisely because they form beliefs and can act on those beliefs. In A New Hope, while stormtroopers are searching Mos Eisley, C-3PO holds the belief that if Artoo locks the door to the room in which they are hiding, then the stormtroopers will check the door, note that it is locked, and move on. Sure enough, that’s exactly what happens and Threepio’s belief is ratified. When Artoo is roaming by himself on Tatooine near caves where Jawas are hiding, he holds the belief that danger is near, adjusts his direction, and rotates his head back and forth to keep an eye out for the suspected danger. He engages in these actions precisely because he holds the belief that danger is near.
Finally, droids have the capacity for language. When Artoo beeps a series of electronic sounds into Luke’s computer on board his X-wing fighter, or to Threepio for translation, this isn’t merely an expression of data communication. Language is dependent upon and expressive of true mental states. It would appear that droids have mental states, and so when they communicate it would appear that what’s being communicated constitutes linguistic expression, and not simply data transference. Droids want other droids and other beings to understand what they are communicating. I want you to understand what I’m experiencing, feeling, thinking, and the like, when I speak to you. So too, when Threepio tries to reassure Luke that Artoo is a reliable droid (while the two are being sold by the Jawas), he wants Luke to understand where he’s coming from in terms of his beliefs about Artoo being a “real bargain.”
“You’ve Been a Great Pal … I’ll Make Sure Mom Doesn’t Sell You”
Do droids have the capacity to enter into social relationships with other persons? Social relationships can be divided into: (a) family relationships, such as Luke’s relationship with his Uncle Owen and Aunt Beru; (b) economic relationships, such as Han Solo or Boba Fett’s relationship with Jabba the Hutt; (c) allegiance relationships, such as those among the multi-species members of the Rebel Alliance; and (d) civil relationships, such as the relationship among the citizens of Naboo, and between them and their elected queen. In each one of these relationships, one finds duties, rights, laws, and obligations that would be appropriate to each relationship. For example, in a family a parent has a duty to take care of a child, and one of the fundamental “laws” in such a relationship is unconditional love. In economic transactions, the fundamental obligation is to the “bottom line” of staying in the black, and the law may include something like “let the buyer beware” or “don’t drop your spice shipment at the first sign of an Imperial cruiser.” In civil relationships, rights and laws are utilized in the most commonly understood way so as to protect citizens from harm, and ensure the prospering of societies as a whole.
On the face of it, it would seem that droids don’t have the capacity to enter into any one of these relationships. After all, they don’t have families, they seem to be barred from economic transactions (“We don’t serve their kind here,” declares the bartender at the Mos Eisley cantina), they aren’t a part of any “droid” interest groups, and they definitely aren’t citizens who bear any rights in either the Republic or the Rebel Alliance. However, two scenes in The Empire Strikes Back make it possible to believe that a kind of familial relationship can be fostered between a droid and a non-droid. First, we note the care and concern Chewie takes when he tries to put C-3PO back together in the cell on Cloud City, and later when he straps C-3PO to his back so as not to abandon him while he and Leia try to free Han and flee from Vader. There is also Luke’s reaction to Artoo’s falling into the swamp after they land on Dagobah. Luke expresses shock, concern, and is even willing to fight to save Artoo from being eaten by whatever monster sucked him up (and subsequently spit him out). The care expressed in both of these cases is analogous to the care a father might have for his son, or an older brother might have for a younger brother. These characters form a kind of family.
Droids also seem to care for their “masters,” as in The Empire Strikes Back when Artoo sits at the foot of the door probing for Luke who is lost out in the cold on Hoth, or in Attack of the Clones when C-3PO’s head realizes (to his shock!) that his battle droid body is shooting at friendly Jedi in the arena on Geonosis: “I’m terribly sorry about all of this!” This indicates, at the very least, a rudimentary reciprocal social relationship.
Yet, droids are exploited. They are treated as little more than pieces of machinery – slaves whose purpose is to serve non-droids. Threepio and Artoo are hunted down, fitted with restraining bolts, and sold by Jawas into slavery. And Threepio refers to his previous “master” when giving his work history to Luke in their initial conversation. Droids lack the rights and responsibilities afforded to other beings such as humans and Wookies, as well as fish-headed and hammerheaded creatures in the Star Wars galaxy.
Given what we know about droids such as Artoo and Threepio, it is unfortunate that they are treated as slaves. Droids communicate, have the capacity for reason, and can be involved in complex social relationships. More importantly, they express feelings of disillusion, contempt, pain, and suffering, as well as joy, satisfaction, and contentment. A being that has these traits appears to have mental states, and such a being is arguably a person, regardless of having been created by persons.
Maybe it’s time for droid liberation in the Star Wars galaxy, in much the same way that other groups of people who have been unjustly enslaved throughout human history have been liberated. Of course, if droids were liberated, then they would need to establish their own social relationships, ways to propagate, moral laws, and the like, for themselves. At the same time, there would need to be adjustments made in the existing social spheres of the Star Wars galaxy to accommodate droid needs and wants, and to mainstream them into existing social spheres, in much the same way Wookies, Gungans, and other creatures have been incorporated.
It’s NOT Our Lot in Life!
I have a proposal to make. Droids appear to meet the qualifications for personhood, so droids should be granted limited rights and privileges. The practical specifics of what that means would need to be worked out by the Galactic Senate. However, such limited rights and privileges minimally would include the choice to work for human beings, as opposed to being slavishly “made to suffer, it’s our lot in life” (to use Threepio’s words in A New Hope) at the hands of humans. I realize, however, that giving them the choice to work for humans probably means that we would be granting them a person-like status, in which case we are well on our way to recognizing droids as deserving of the same kinds of rights and privileges afforded to any other person.
The case can be made that droids are an oppressed group in the Star Wars galaxy. Perhaps we ought to cheer for a droid rebellion against an organic empire? The issue of treating droids as persons may seem silly to talk about because, after all, it’s just a make-believe story! As history has proven, though, science fiction has a way of becoming science fact. The famous robotics engineer and theorist, Hans Moravec, claims that by 2050 robots actually will surpass humans in intellectual capacity. The way in which advances in computer and robotic technology are being made at an astronomical rate gives us cause to pause and consider that, in the not-so-distant future, there most likely will be advanced forms of machinery that behave much like C-3PO and R2-D2. How then, will the organic community react? How should such non-organic persons who seem to behave like organic persons be treated?
[Footnote/bibliographic references deleted]
(Copyright Open Court Press, 2005. All rights reserved.)
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